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War College: Book Reviews

BOOK REVIEWS

PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES
Maritime Security Cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea: Prospects and Challenges, by Kamal-Deen Ali�
Leiden, Neth�: Brill, 2015� 372 pages�

In Maritime Security Cooperation in the
Gulf of Guinea, the legal adviser to the
Ghana Navy, Commander Dr. KamalDeen Ali, argues that the world should
pay attention to the maritime domain of
West and Central Africa. The same argument can be made about his book, as
Ali not only provides the most in-depth
analysis of maritime security prospects
and challenges in the Gulf of Guinea to
date but offers conceptual frameworks
for maritime security that are applicable
around the world. Furthermore, the
lessons that can be extracted from the
Gulf of Guinea experience—both the
problems of insecurity and the efforts
to address them—can serve as helpful guidance for approaching similar
challenges elsewhere. Notwithstanding the relative absence of credible
literature on maritime security in West
and Central Africa, this book exhibits
the rigor of first-rate legal scholarship
combined with the intimate knowledge
gleaned from an insider’s perspective,
making it undoubtedly a seminal work
on both the Gulf of Guinea specifically
and maritime security in general.
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Ali begins, rather helpfully, by exploring
the meaning of several terms. First and
foremost, he seeks to provide a working definition of the “Gulf of Guinea,”
as the phrase has been used for years
without any real consistency to describe
the maritime region of West and Central
Africa. Ultimately, the author expands
the range of states included in this
important region. At a minimum, Ali includes the twenty-five member states of
the Maritime Organization of West and
Central Africa, all of which are members
of either the Economic Community of
West African States (ECOWAS) or the
Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS). But he notes
that Rwanda, which recently rejoined
ECCAS, should not be included, as its
strategic interests do not align with the
maritime domain of West and Central
Africa. On the other hand, he argues that
Mauritania, which left ECOWAS in 2000
and is a member of the Arab Maghreb
Union, should be included, as it is an
important partner for maritime security
cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea. This
argument constitutes the first of many
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novel contributions the book makes to
the context-specific dynamics of maritime security in West and Central Africa.
Beyond defining the Gulf of Guinea,
Ali makes a convincing case for the
region’s global strategic significance. The
economic contribution of the region to
the global energy, mineral, and agriculture markets makes the national security
concerns of states in West and Central
Africa concerns for the entire world.
Even after the decline in the price of oil,
Ali’s case remains unimpeachable, as his
arguments for the region’s geostrategic
relevance go far beyond oft-repeated
statements about Nigerian oil in particular. With details about the region’s
contribution to the global supply of
cotton, cacao, and fish, one need never
mention oil to recognize the economic
significance of the Gulf of Guinea.
These arguments lend further weight to
the examples and analyses of the main
portions of the book, but the conceptual features of the book are perhaps
its most significant academic feature.
In reviewing the literature on maritime
security, Ali exposes some significant
gaps, in both coverage of issues and existing conceptual frameworks. He begins
his analysis by asking a few important
questions: What is security? What is
maritime security? And for whom is
maritime security? In dissecting some
of the existing works on maritime
security, he comes to advocate a “human security” approach, but compiles
elements from a number of different
sources. He thus settles on maritime
security as being a composite of societal
security, environmental security, food
security, and economic security. One
could argue, therefore, that this
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approach aligns maritime security more
closely with development than defense.
Conceptually, Ali charts new territory
on several fronts. First, his analysis
of the theoretical underpinnings of
security lead him to the conclusion that,
although the literature is largely silent in
doing so, the theoretical approaches to
“security” in general can be applied to
the maritime realm as well. He writes, “It
is argued that since the ocean environment serves the political, economic, and
strategic objectives of States, the dynamics that surround the pursuit of all interstate interests will similarly be reflected
in the maritime realm.” This notion of
the activities, interests, and challenges of
the maritime domain being interrelated
with the broader national interests suggests that a state’s maritime territory is a
microcosm of the state itself. Thus maritime security cannot be severed from
national interests—security, development, governance, etc.—and is, indeed,
a fundamental component of them.
Ali’s second departure from the literature involves taking an evolutionary approach to maritime security. By
examining how maritime security has
developed from being a matter merely
of transportation security into a field
posing integrated, multisectoral challenges today, he shows how the concept
of maritime security has changed and
broadened over time. Furthermore, he
contends that states’ maritime concerns
are context specific rather than universal. Partly for this reason, he also
asserts that there is no real consensus
on the elements of maritime security,
allowing for a wide conception of what
is included. He seems to suggest that
the best approach in the literature is in
the 2008 UN secretary-general’s Oceans
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and the Law of the Sea report, which
lists (section V[B]) the main maritime
security threats as “piracy and armed
robbery against ships”; “terrorist acts
involving shipping, offshore installations
and other maritime interests”; “[i]llicit
trafficking in arms and weapons of mass
destruction”; “illicit traffic in narcotic
drugs and psychotropic substances”;
“[s]muggling and trafficking of persons by sea”; “[i]llegal, unreported and
unregulated fishing”; and “intentional
and unlawful damage to the marine
environment.” He later assesses this
set of threats, along with others, in the
specific context of the Gulf of Guinea.
The third main departure is Ali’s novel
framework for conceiving of maritime
security. His framework, elaborated
throughout the book, has three elements: (1) identifying the maritime
security threat path; (2) applying the
threat path to geopolitical and geostrategic features; and (3) implementing a
three-layer, three-indicator approach.
The maritime security threat path is a
bit more than merely a list of generic or
even specific maritime security threats.
It examines both the activity and the effects of any given threat. This approach
allows for the contextualization of the
threats versus geopolitical or strategic
priorities. The third element of the
framework then concerns the approach
to those threats, involving three layers—
national capacity, regional cooperation,
and global support—paired with three
progress indicators—improved
maritime governance, adequate legal
frameworks, and an inclusive maritime security concept. While the book
elaborates this conceptual approach in
the Gulf of Guinea context, it is applicable globally. Further academic
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work is therefore warranted, applying
Ali’s conceptual framework to other
contexts besides the Gulf of Guinea.
As significant as this book’s theoretical contribution may be to the academic literature on maritime security in
general, the book’s contribution to the
discourse on maritime security in the
Gulf of Guinea is impossible to express
adequately. As a Ghanaian naval officer
and legal adviser, Ali is able to delve
into the subject matter in a way that
few could. The majority of the book is
dedicated to the region-specific analysis,
and this is truly the heart of the work.
Given the resource constraints of West
and Central Africa as well as the transnational nature of many of the threats,
it is not surprising that cooperation
is seen as the overarching answer to
addressing maritime insecurity in the
region. But the architecture of maritime
security cooperation is still very much
under construction. Ali meticulously
dissects the challenges, internal and
external, that plague the progress of
effectively using cooperation as a means
of countering threats. His personal
familiarity with the processes afoot
takes the chapters on both regional approaches and international partnerships
beyond the capacity of normal academic
scholarship. Indeed, one could not look
up most of the information contained
in these portions, further adding to
the tremendous value of this volume.
Similarly, the legal analysis in this book
would be difficult for any scholar outside
the region to replicate. Ali’s access to
national laws and regional legal frameworks as well as his detailed understanding of international maritime law affords
him the opportunity to provide insight
into both the legal developments and
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challenges in the Gulf of Guinea. Indeed,
the book may be viewed as a compendium of the existing legal regimes in the
Gulf of Guinea. This legal landscape is
important to understand as efforts proceed to combat maritime insecurity and
enhance maritime governance through
cooperation. The section on emerging
jurisdictional issues and legal complexities is particularly significant, as it
provides a helpful warning of problems
that are likely to arise as the cooperative architecture continues to develop.
Naturally, one of the challenges of writing an analysis of real-world issues is
that they do not remain constant. If one
were to attempt to identify a criticism
of the book, it is that it is already out of
date on a few specific issues, although
one hardly can blame that on the author.
For example, the section on private
security companies or private maritime
security companies, if written today,
likely would include a number of new
issues as well as new accountability
mechanisms. But the analysis and lessons that can be gleaned remain sound
and important, even if additional facts
exist that could enhance the discussion.
The book expressly arrives at five main
conclusions: (1) Current processes for
maritime security cooperation in the
Gulf of Guinea do not address adequately the multiple security threats in the
region. (2) Poor governance contributes
significantly to maritime security threats
in the Gulf of Guinea, but the current
cooperative framework does not address
the land-sea nexus of maritime security
concerns. (3) The relevant legal framework for maritime security in the Gulf of
Guinea is poorly developed, and this undermines the effectiveness of maritime
security enforcement and regional and
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international cooperation. (4) Prevailing
regional cooperative processes lack coordination and have suffered several setbacks. (5) International support for maritime security cooperation in the Gulf
of Guinea is inadequate, uncoordinated,
and in some cases driven by national interests that affect its overall effectiveness.
These conclusions, as well as the analysis
that led to them, serve as an invaluable
aid in the ongoing effort to secure the
maritime domain of West and Central
Africa. This book is a must-read for
maritime security scholars and anyone
—from policy makers to industry
leaders to students—working on maritime matters in the Gulf of Guinea.
IAN M. RALBY

Marie von Clausewitz: The Woman behind the
Making of On War, by Vanya Eftimova Bellinger.
Oxford Univ. Press, 2015. 312 pages. $29.95.

One is tempted to ask why naval officers
should be interested in reading a biography of the wife of the famous Prussian
philosopher of war Carl von Clausewitz.
In answer we might go to the words of
Marie von Clausewitz herself, from her
letter of dedication to Carl’s unfinished
masterpiece On War: “Readers will be
rightly surprised that a woman should
dare to write a preface for such a work
as this. My friends will need no explanation. . . . Those who knew of our happy
marriage and knew that we shared everything, not only joy and pain but also
every occupation, every concern of daily
life, will realize that a task of this kind
could not occupy my beloved husband
without at the same time becoming
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thoroughly familiar to me” (preface to
Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and
trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret
[Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press,
1986], p. 65 [emphasis in original]).
In other words, to understand better
On War’s hidden treasures, it helps
to understand the formidable woman
behind On War. We historians have
this quaint notion that understanding
the context for things helps one better understand the things themselves.
For naval professionals, especially at
the Naval War College, which owes
so much to the Prusso-German intellectual tradition, to understand better
the genesis of the greatest philosophy of
war is no small thing. (Readers interested in evidence for this idea should
consult Ronald H. Spector, Professors
of War: The Naval War College and the
Development of the Naval Profession
[Honolulu, HI: Univ. Press of the Pacific,
2005; originally published by the Naval
War College Press, 1977], pp. 14–17).
Additionally, Bellinger’s biography is
the result of a fruitful collaboration
with Donald Stoker, who has published
a companion biography of Marie’s
more-famous husband. Together they
mined a treasure trove of recently
uncovered correspondence between
Carl and Marie held in Germany by the
(now) famous couple’s descendants.
Marie von Clausewitz is more than just
a biography of a woman married to an
officer and military theorist; it covers the
spectrum of relevant social, intellectual,
military, political, and feminist history.
It is truly a synthesis of all these forms,
much like Peter Paret’s Clausewitz and
the State (1976), which has held the field
on the details of Clausewitz’s life and
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times until now. As advertised, though,
the book is centered on the life of his
companion and lifelong love, Countess
Marie von Brühl. With her formidable
language skills, Bellinger does exceptional work in bringing the history, and even
the prehistory, of the Brühl family to life.
Many surprises await the reader regarding Marie’s background and influence.
For example, she was no “ordinary”
Prussian countess, but rather a daughter of an imperial count of the Holy
Roman Empire. As an imperial aristocrat, she frequented only the very
highest social circles in Europe. Her
friends and acquaintances were queens,
princesses, and various types of grand
duchesses—all themselves politically
influential women, in an age when few
women wielded such influence.
Marie’s elevated background raises
the book’s first major question, which
Bellinger poses in this way (p. 47): “How
and why did a countess raised in the
highest social circles ever allow herself
to consider marrying a man with conspicuously less social standing?” Carl’s
family had only a dubious claim to the
“von”—which denoted nobility—in front
of his name, he being a son of (at best) a
very minor provincial official. Bellinger
answers the question in this way (p. 8),
and it tells one much about both Carl
and Marie: “Indeed, from the very
beginning of their romance, the couple
determinedly defied the parochial attitudes of the time and strived to build a
relationship if not equal in status, then
at least equal in nature. . . . [I]t was Carl’s
promise to treat her as an independent
and free individual that made this formidable countess decide upon marriage
with a man of lesser social standing.”
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In other words, Carl and Marie managed to rise above the social norms of
their times. Until now we have had only
Carl’s perspective, as it were—the one
we read in On War. By telling the story
of the collaboration between the two,
Bellinger’s book makes clear that the real
political animal in the family was Marie,
not Carl. Her influence can be judged by
the fact that after Carl resigned his commission in the Prussian army and left
for Russia to join its army—without the
Prussian king’s written permission—the
king still acknowledged Marie, and even
nodded to her at court functions. As for
Carl, the king never forgave him completely; he did allow him to rejoin the
Prussian army later, but never gave him
a position of real influence. Again, this
misfortune is our good fortune, since
it probably allowed Carl the extra time,
beyond that required for his minimal
duties at the Kriegsakademie in Berlin,
to write and rewrite his masterpiece.
One also learns that Marie was very active in supporting her husband’s career,
and developed friendships and corresponded independently of Carl with the
great figures of the day, especially General August Neithardt von Gneisenau.
Marie’s mother, interestingly, was from
the British middle class (a story in itself),
and she taught Marie to speak English
exceptionally well for a German aristocrat. This probably further cemented her
relationship with Gneisenau, who also
spoke English fluently. The two were
so close that Marie, an accomplished
painter, later executed one of the more
famous existing portraits of Gneisenau.
Bellinger herself is married to a military
service member. Because of that experience, as she writes about this military
marriage she has an exceptional eye for
the sorts of details that some academics
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might miss. Her text is full of interesting insights and observations on the
extraordinary couple, but also includes
details that even sailors will recognize,
such as the fact that Marie and Carl
numbered all their letters when he was
in the field so they could tell if some
were missing. (The reviewer used this
very technique with his spouse during
his many cruises in the U.S. Navy.)
Readers looking for new insights on
the Prussian perspective from inside
the Prussian court during the Napoleonic Wars will be well rewarded, as will
those interested in how little or how
much Marie played a role in the genesis
and writing of On War, the subject that
occupies roughly the last quarter of the
book. Addressing Marie’s pivotal role in
getting Carl’s work published, Bellinger
leaves little doubt that without Marie
there might have been no On War for
us to read today, nor any of Carl’s other
works. Ms. Bellinger’s work reminds
us that a human life is rarely a solo accomplishment, lived apart and distinct
from other human beings. Rather, a
relationship such as that of Marie and
Carl von Clausewitz is an enterprise
lived in collaboration with others of our
kind—or in Marie’s case, not her kind—
especially those we love and who love us.
Highly recommended for all audiences.
JOHN T. KUEHN

A Higher Standard: Leadership Strategies from
America’s First Female Four-Star General, by Ann
Dunwoody. Boston: Da Capo, 2015. 288 pages.
$25.99 (Kindle $14.99).

In this book, General Ann Dunwoody,
USA (Ret.), traces her illustrious career
from initial entry into the Women’s
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Army Corps in 1975 as a second lieutenant through her promotion to four-star
general to her retirement in 2012 as
the commander of the Army Materiel
Command (AMC). Dunwoody came
from an army family: her father was
a veteran of both Korea and Vietnam
and retired as a brigadier general; her
brother was a West Point graduate; and a
sister was one of the Army’s first female
helicopter pilots. Throughout her remarkable career, Ann Dunwoody blazed
a trail with a lengthy list of “firsts”:

• First female field-grade officer in the
82nd Airborne Division

• First female to command a battalion
in the 82nd Airborne Division

• First female to command the Combined Arms Support Command

• First female in the U.S. military to

achieve the rank of four-star general

Dunwoody’s promotion to four-star
general made front-page news across the
country and brought instant recognition
outside military circles. Yet Dunwoody
remained well-grounded, with strong
support from her family. She relates stories about her mother and father and the
influence each played in her career. She
also tells about her husband, Craig, and
how important he was to her success.
These stories really enable the reader to
relate to her on a personal level. Dunwoody writes (p. 72): “Throughout my
life I’ve met plenty of superheroes, but
the strongest and most effective among
them were the ones who were simply
human and knew they weren’t perfect.”
The title of the book, A Higher Standard,
is important to Dunwoody. “Those
words became the foundation of my
leadership philosophy and a central part
of how I tried to live my life.” Dunwoody
explains that she consistently worked
hard to maintain a higher standard for
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both herself and whatever organization
she led. After speaking to executives at
Coca-Cola, Dunwoody related, “After
managing nearly sixty-nine thousand
employees, one thing is clear to me:
there is a higher standard that provides the foundation upon which every
effective leadership journey is built.”
We all could learn from her mantra.
This is truly a book about leadership,
with each chapter showcasing important lessons and strategies applicable to
leaders in any organization. Dunwoody
highlights that “[t]his is not a manual
about how to become a general, nor will
I reveal a secret recipe for becoming a
great leader.” Her sincerity and passion
for the Army team are evident. Chapter
2, “Wendell Would Be Proud—‘Never
Walk by a Mistake’”—chronicles her
relationship, as a new second lieutenant platoon leader, with her platoon
sergeant, Sergeant First Class Wendell
Bowen. Dunwoody writes (p. 38): “Sergeant Bowen shared wisdom on many
levels that guided me through every step
of my military career.” In this chapter,
she discusses the important leadership
lessons that young officers and new
leaders in any company must learn.
Dunwoody is a good storyteller, and the
lessons she shares are easy for the reader
to relate to. The leadership lessons are
summarized in the postscript: “Leadership Strategies from an Army Life.”
Another chapter, “Leader of Leaders—
‘Build Your Bench,’” enables Dunwoody
to chronicle her work to promote and
build the succession plan at AMC
prior to her retirement. She relates
(p. 223): “One of the most important
jobs a senior leader has is to develop
leaders or to ‘build the bench.’” This
is a critical lesson that many leaders
never learn—to the detriment of the
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organizations they lead. Countless leaders are often too involved in promoting themselves, and see developing
subordinates as a sign of weakness.
The final chapter, “Afterthoughts—
‘My Way to Continue the Conversation . . . ,’” was initially confusing. It
did not flow with the rest of the book;
it seemed disjointed; it seemed to be
made up of random thoughts about a
variety of topics. I eventually realized
that it was Dunwoody’s way of discussing and underscoring contemporary
issues she believes are important.
During my almost thirty-year career in
the U.S. Army, I was privileged to serve
in the 10th Mountain Division with Ann
Dunwoody. Her technical and tactical
skills, along with her keen insight and
caring attitude, made her a positive role
model. It is fitting that she ends every
talk with the phrase “In the end, we’re all
just soldiers, but that’s the highest thing
you could claim to be.” Dunwoody’s legacy in the Army and the larger U.S. military will impact generations of young
Americans for years to come. This book
showcases her exceptional talents as an
army officer and leader. It is a mustread for leaders at all levels, in both
the military and other organizations.
THOMAS J. GIBBONS

Lawfare: Law as a Weapon of War, by Orde F.
Kittrie. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2016. 504
pages. $29.95 (Kindle $14.41).

In Lawfare: Law as a Weapon of War,
legal scholar Orde F. Kittrie analyzes the
increasing effectiveness of the use of law
to achieve objectives that not long ago
might have been achievable only using
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force. In one of the first major works
in English on the practice of lawfare,
Kittrie has written an important book
for lawyers, policy makers, and military
strategists. Successful strategic performance requires an appreciation of the
role of politics in war, and because law
is an intensely political matter it is an
integral part of the strategic operating
environment. Kittrie’s highly readable
Lawfare enhances our understanding of
the growing strategic potential of law.
This book is at once a history of lawfare,
a collection of representative case studies, and a resource for other researchers.
The foreword by former CIA director R.
James Woolsey Jr. is itself an interesting
read, setting up Kittrie’s analysis with a
description of the international legal arena as a sheriff-less “Wild West” exploited
by various governments and nonstate
actors. The author also describes his
own foray into lawfare as a professor
at Arizona State University, where his
analysis of Iran’s dependence on external
gasoline suppliers eventually led to the
Comprehensive Iran Sanctions Accountability and Divestment Act of 2010. Kittrie’s practical bent is evident throughout Lawfare, and he offers numerous
suggestions for incorporating lawfare
into U.S. national security strategy.
Among the strengths of Lawfare are the
concepts provided in the first chapter
that prepare the reader for the case
studies that follow. Kittrie begins with
a historical overview, tracing lawfare
back to the seventeenth century, when
Hugo Grotius used legal arguments to
bolster Dutch maritime power. Kittrie’s section on the literature of lawfare
provides a unique summary of the
leading works in the field. Kittrie breaks
down the practice of lawfare into two
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categories: instrumental lawfare—the
use of legal methods to achieve results
typically sought from kinetic weapons;
and compliance leverage disparity—the
seeking of advantages over an opponent
more disposed to comply with the law.
Kittrie attributes the rise of lawfare to
three factors: the increased number and
reach of international laws and tribunals,
the rise of nongovernmental organizations focused on the law of armed
conflict, and the advance of globalization and economic interdependence.
Kittrie follows up his macro-level
conceptual analysis with detailed case
studies at the micro level that exemplify
the prevalent trends in lawfare. His
examples move from the battlefields of
the Middle East through the courtrooms
of New York to the doctrinal manuals of
the Chinese military. The range of examples, all linked by the common theme
of lawfare’s increasing effectiveness,
underscores how widespread and multifaceted the phenomenon has become.
Kittrie devotes four of his eight chapters
to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which
he describes (p. 197) as “the closest thing
the world has to a lawfare laboratory.”
For example, Israel’s experience with
maritime law in 2011 demonstrates how
“offensive” lawfare can achieve a military
objective without using force. In May
2010, Israeli forces intercepted a flotilla
of ships from Turkey attempting to violate a blockade of the Hamas-controlled
Gaza Strip, killing nine people. A UN
fact-finding mission subsequently
criticized Israel for its handling of the
incident. Faced with a similar flotilla
preparing to leave Greece in June 2011,
Israeli lawyers used legal measures to
stop the ships from leaving port. Those
measures included threatening legal
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action against companies providing
the ships with essential services such as
maritime insurance. In letters to these
companies, Israeli lawyers referenced
the U.S. Supreme Court case of Holder
v. Humanitarian Law Project (561 U.S.
1 [2010], 130 S.Ct. 2705) to argue that
providing services to the flotilla was illegal because it supported terrorism. The
letters proved persuasive. By rendering
the ships unable to secure the necessary
services to gain permission to leave their
Greek ports, Israel succeeded in stopping
the 2011 flotilla without firing a shot.
Kittrie devotes a chapter to China’s innovative approach to lawfare. He explains
how China systematically wages lawfare
across the strategic operating environment, including maritime, aviation,
and space lawfare, as well as lawfare
in cyberspace. For example, Kittrie
analyzes how China is using maritime
law to justify denying access to the South
China Sea for international navigation.
China has developed a concept of lawfare it calls falu zhan, or “legal warfare,”
as part of its military doctrine. Kittrie’s
case studies show how China incorporates lawfare into its strategy through a
comprehensive approach coordinated
across the Chinese government.
Unlike China, the United States has no
similar comprehensive lawfare strategy. Kittrie describes how parts of the
U.S. government nevertheless have
employed legal techniques successfully to achieve strategic results, such as
the U.S. Treasury’s use of international
financial laws against Iran. Some of the
most effective U.S. lawfare has been the
work of private-sector attorneys rather
than U.S. government actions. Kittrie
provides several examples of litigation that used the Antiterrorism Act
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of 1990. A significant case was Boim
v. Holy Land Foundation, in which attorneys working on behalf of the family
of a U.S. victim of terrorism secured a
judgment against Islamic fund-raising
organizations, drying up a significant
source of material support to Hamas.
Kittrie concludes with a compelling
argument for a more creative and innovative integration of lawfare into
U.S. strategy. As he observes (p. 96),
the 2015 National Security Strategy
identifies security challenges that are
decentralized, transcend state borders,
involve nonstate actors, and “cannot
be neutralized using only deterrence
or the United States’ traditional kinetic toolbox.” Lawfare underscores
why strategists must have a practical
understanding of the entire spectrum of
factors affecting the strategic operating
environment—informational, cultural,
political, economic, social, and legal.
Kittrie understands that it is unrealistic
to expect strategists and policy makers
to be legal experts as well, so his conclusions include an analysis of the sources
of “lawfare power” and recommendations for leveraging the skills of the U.S.
legal community. To show how privatesector expertise can inform potential
military uses of lawfare, Kittrie describes
how Special Operations Command
Pacific reached out to the University of
Pennsylvania’s law school for research on
foreign criminal laws that could be used
to detain and prosecute foreign fighters
supporting the Islamic State. In Kittrie’s
assessment (p. 32), if the United States
properly leverages its extensive legal
expertise to support a national lawfare
strategy, the “U.S. advantage in sophisticated legal weapons has the potential
to be even greater than its advantage
in sophisticated lethal weapons.”
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Lawfare reminds us that lethal force
is only one of many factors affecting
outcomes in war. Kittrie points the way
toward how legal factors can be used to
achieve practical effects. Military officers
and policy makers who read this book
will be rewarded with a better understanding of the legal dynamics that are
exerting an increasingly powerful influence on the legitimate use of violence.
KEVIN ROUSSEAU

Playing War: Wargaming and U.S. Navy Preparations for World War II, by John M. Lillard. Lincoln: Potomac Books, Univ. of Nebraska Press,
2016. 224 pages. $39.95 (Kindle $26.37).

With the Navy’s recent efforts to reinvigorate war gaming, there has been
renewed interest in the interwar gaming
conducted at the Naval War College in
Newport, Rhode Island. In the Naval
War College Review, Proceedings, and
other maritime journals, war-gaming
experts and enthusiasts alike have tried
to characterize the nature and value of
the Navy’s war games played between
1919 and 1941. John Lillard’s Playing
War: Wargaming and U.S. Navy Preparations for World War II is the latest
contribution to this resurgence. Seeking to provide a comprehensive study
of the interwar games conducted at the
College, Lillard intends to inform our
understanding of the “navy’s transition”
during this period. Playing War asserts
(p. 8) that the Newport games were
“transformational” and played a “central
role . . . in preparing the navy for war.”
For the most part, the author contributes
to the history of that era, but does so
with a work that would have benefited
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from additional editing and more attention to detail in its historiography.
This book succeeds with its analysis of
how the Newport war games evolved to
reflect the emergence of new technologies and operational thinking for the
Navy. Lillard organizes his analysis into
three phases: early (1919–27); middle
(1928–34); and late (1935–41). He
focuses on one or two College classes
within each of the phases, concentrating
on those of significant figures such as
Chester Nimitz, Thomas Hart, Harold
Stark, Kelly Turner, Bull Halsey, and
Robert Ghormley. The author is at
his best when he analyzes the actual
games played and describes the relevant
insights recorded by the student-players
or the gaming faculty, or both. For example, his section on Tactical Game 94
of 1923 describes how that game demonstrated the importance of reconnaissance
and detection of the enemy’s forces first.
In his chapter on the middle phase, Lillard explains how the games explored
the innovations of air and undersea
warfare, pointing out that the players
learned more about aviation than they
did submarines. Lillard concedes that
the College games were not innovative
in themselves; instead he reinforces the
idea that “they were a common playing
field, a shared experience” for the men
who would fight the next war at sea.
Playing War is a useful complement to
Edward Miller’s War Plan Orange: The
U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897–1945
(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press,
1991) and Albert Nofi’s To Train the
Fleet for War: The U.S. Navy Fleet Problems, 1923–1940 (Newport, RI: Naval
War College Press, 2010). Lillard’s examination of the 1933 Van Auken report
is particularly effective at showing the
College’s contributions to the evolution
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of War Plan ORANGE and the fleet problems. Requested by College President
Admiral Harris Laning and written by
Captain Wilbur R. Van Auken, head
of the newly created Research Department, the report summarized lessons
learned from all the Blue-Orange games
played between 1927 and 1933. The
author notes that Van Auken’s analysis
of the Trans Pacific problem presaged
the logistic challenges of the war and
the advent of the four hundred destroyer escorts that emerged during the
war. As War Plan ORANGE matured in
the 1930s, so too did the war gaming,
marked by the construction of Pringle
Hall and its famously square-tiled gaming floor. Lillard succinctly chronicles
Newport’s war-gaming transformation throughout the book’s narrative.
Readers familiar with the scholarship
that examines the U.S. Navy between
the two world wars will be distracted
by Lillard’s efforts to set his thesis apart
from the other literature. Playing War
looks and feels most similar to Michael
Vlahos’s The Blue Sword: The Naval
War College and the American Mission, 1919–1941 (Newport, RI: Naval
War College Press, 1980). Both of these
works are short in length, and have
appendices and tables that lay out the
war games played by each class. Lillard’s
book focuses more directly on the games
and the chronology of the College than
Vlahos’s monograph does. However, in
attempting to separate his research from
The Blue Sword, Lillard states (p. 10) that
Vlahos “did not use wargame records
from the Naval War College archives,”
which is not true. Making matters more
confusing, Lillard continues to refer
to Vlahos’s text throughout the book.
Later, Lillard asserts (p. 12) that John
Hattendorf, coauthor of Sailors and
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Scholars: The Centennial History of the
U.S. Naval War College (Newport, RI:
Naval War College Press, 1984), is “a
former professor of naval history” whose
history of the College lacks “critical
analysis.” At the time of publication,
Hattendorf was and remains the Ernest
J. King Professor of Maritime History
at the Naval War College, and is still
recognized as the preeminent scholar on
the history of the U.S. Navy at Newport.
In addition to these two notable errors,
Playing War still reads like a dissertation in need of another round of editing.
Chapter introductions and descriptions
of the students are repeated several times
and add little to the analysis presented.
With the main body of the book ending
at 137 pages, this work leaves the reader
with the impression that there is still
more to explore about the relationship
between the interwar war games and
how the U.S. Navy fought during the
Second World War. While this imperfect
volume has some merit, the definitive
history of the Naval War College’s interwar war games remains to be written.
JON SCOTT LOGEL

Social Science Goes to War: The Human Terrain
System in Iraq and Afghanistan, ed. Montgomery
McFate and Janice H. Laurence. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2015. 320 pages. $39.95 (Kindle
$22.99).

The twenty-first-century security
environment has been characterized by
numerous cross-cultural battle spaces,
such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The U.S. Army initiated the human
terrain team (HTT) because it needed
to address the impact of the human
cultural dimension in the combat
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operational environment. The HTT’s
mission was to conduct research (in the
social sciences and anthropology) and
to advise military commanders about
the unique cultural aspects of the local/
regional population. In eleven chapters,
McFate and Laurence have compiled
an invaluable collection of experiences
from the scientists involved. They afford
us the opportunity to accompany these
scientists on their journeys, as they share
their perspectives with the military. We
learn the value of embedding social
scientists with military units and how
important their knowledge and expertise
are for military leaders to achieve an understanding of today’s complex, culturally diverse operational environments.
In this way, social scientists can help
military leaders make more-informed,
and therefore better, decisions.
General David Petraeus (Ret.) states
in the foreword that the “key terrain in irregular warfare is the human
terrain.” He highlights the role social
scientists played in shaping the cultural
framework of the battle space and how
they contributed to military leaders’
knowledge to ensure mission success.
General Petraeus posits the notion that
the military indeed may require even
greater sociocultural knowledge to
conduct future military operations.
Today’s military leaders are well trained
in tactics, techniques, and procedures;
however, the twenty-first-century
battle space presents inherent difficulties for military leaders. One of
their principal deficiencies is a lack of
cross-cultural competence (C3). C3 is
the ability to communicate effectively
and appropriately with people of other
cultures. As the number of multinational coalition military operations
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continues to increase, military leaders
will need to achieve C3 to be effective.
Military leaders must be prepared to
adapt to a wide range of cultural, social,
and political challenges in the operational environment. Education in cultural
competency, cultural intelligence, and
social intelligence plays a pivotal role in
a military leader’s ability to lead, build
relationships based on trust, and develop
unity of effort and command within
complex, culturally diverse environments. A leader’s ability to engage and
communicate effectively requires that he
or she understand the unique social and
behavioral qualities of the local population. This capability is a requirement
for successful negotiation and conflict
management. Lack of it can mean the
difference between success and failure.
This volume is a tribute to the knowledge and expertise of social scientists
who served as members of HTTs. Their
stories serve as evidence of their unique
experiences, insights, and contributions
toward achieving cultural understanding in combat zones in places such as
Iraq and Afghanistan. It is worth noting that HTTs offered more than just
cultural expertise. Rather, they made
a considerable investment in developing relationships with local people
and provided their military units with
critical assessments about operating in
and among members’ host nations. This
information was critical for military
decision makers and those involved in
counterinsurgency campaigns, so it was
critical for the social scientists as soon
as possible to build rapport and credibility with the local population, as well
as with the military units to which they
were assigned. Laurence and McFate
invite us to share their experiences as
we join each scientist on that journey.
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For example, James Dorough-Lewis’s
chapter, “Investing in Uncertainty,”
provides a clear illustration of some of
the challenges the social scientists faced
in the HTTs. We learn about the need to
delineate between social scientists and
members of the Intelligence Community. This distinction is critical for social
scientists as they attempt to establish
relationships based on trust and credibility. Their research task is to assess
and understand the cultural nuances
and the cultural environment that may
impact the overall military operation;
in contrast, the intelligence analyst
probes the environment for meaningful
information that will be used to understand the operational environment.
The social scientist seeks to understand
each individual’s cultural perspective
and relationships among people living
in the environment. Social scientists and
anthropologists in the HTTs work with
the local people to build relationships
based on trust and to find ways to help
local people continue with their daily
lives. In one such example (p. 196), the
Army had built a hospital to meet all the
security requirements. However, Sunni
women needing medical care preferred
to travel to a hospital an hour away—
rather than travel the path on which
their husbands, sons, and brothers had
lost their lives. Social scientists were
able to communicate with these women
and understand their cultural perspective, which they shared with the military
team. This incident highlights the need
to understand the culture, beliefs, and
values of the local people when operating in a culturally diverse region. Social
scientists provide a cultural lens toward
the local people, examining and explaining how they perceive what is happening
in their unique cultural point of view.
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This book provides the perspectives
and experiences of social scientists who,
embedded with military teams, shared
their knowledge and cultural expertise
to help military leaders make informed
decisions within culturally diverse
environments. This volume will prove
to be an invaluable resource for military
leaders, as it highlights the importance
and impact of understanding the role
of cultural diversity in military operations. McFate and Laurence have
performed a service to the military by
providing a valuable resource for all
military leaders to guide them in future
military operations. In addition, this
book applauds those scientists who were
daring enough to join in the human
terrain effort and share their experiences
with us. The ability to achieve cultural
competence must be viewed as a warfighting imperative and as a prerequisite for all future military leaders. This
volume is informative and inspiring—a
must-read for all those interested in
the cultural and human dimensions
of multinational warfare. The detailed
bibliography provides recommendations for further reading to enhance
the reader’s knowledge of this topic.
YVONNE R. MASAKOWSKI

Relentless Strike: The Secret History of Joint Special
Operations Command, by Sean Naylor. New York:
St. Martin’s, 2015. 560 pages. $29.99 (paperback
$17.99, Kindle $14.99).

Once again, Sean Naylor has produced
an authoritative and well-written book.
Relentless Strike chronicles the history
of the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), America’s top-tier special
operations military unit. To the benefit
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of history and the reader, and most likely
to the consternation of the Pentagon,
Naylor’s knowledge of special operations
and his extensive contacts reveal the
temperaments and competencies of key
individuals and the details of numerous
clandestine missions and organizational
capabilities. Many will condemn Naylor
for revealing these secrets, but the
fault is not with Naylor; it is with those
who talked. The book also, perhaps
unintentionally, exposes flaws in how
the United States wages war, as well as
the limitations of special operations.
The book begins by recounting the
creation of JSOC after the failed Iranian
hostage rescue operation in 1980. New
threats to national security required a
new military organization that had the
resources and capabilities to respond
quickly to crises and apply specialized military capabilities to rescue
hostages, kill terrorists, and neutralize
weapons of mass destruction. Naylor
reminds us that senior military leaders opposed the new command, but
the failure in Iran trumped parochial
thinking. The second and more interesting part of the book addresses the
expansion of JSOC as one result of the
momentous impact of the 9/11 attacks.
From the beginning, JSOC had significant advantages over both conventional
military organizations and nonaffiliated special operations units. The units
placed under JSOC’s direct control were
the best-trained and best-resourced
units in the military. Each of these
units had its own sophisticated—and
grueling—selection process. Remarkably, JSOC headquarters had nothing
that mirrored such careful processes
for selecting its staff. Also oddly, the
Pentagon had no process for selecting
a JSOC commander whose experience
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and temperament matched the requirements of a national force. To be sure,
some of JSOC’s early commanders were
excellent—but that was the exception.
This deficiency became clear in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks.
The 1980s and ’90s were a period of
steady growth in terms of structure,
budget, and formalized relationships
throughout the interagency world. JSOC
was required to be ready to launch a
task force within four hours for a variety
of missions of national importance.
Although specific mission requirements ultimately would dictate the task
force’s composition, significant mission
“enablers” from inside the Defense Department and external to it always had
to be on standby. It required dedication
of a dozen Air Force transport aircraft
to deploy the JSOC staff, operators,
helicopters, ground-assault vehicles,
and other necessary equipment for
initial operations. This initial package
often would encompass five hundred
people, and more people and equipment
frequently would follow. Additionally, being ready for every contingency
required JSOC to have a comprehensive liaison network throughout many
government agencies, especially the
Intelligence Community. This formulaic
approach to every mission resulted in
a large task force being deployed for
almost every problem. As a result, JSOC
unintentionally undermined its ability to
deploy clandestinely and remain agile.
During this time frame, JSOC deployed
to war alongside conventional forces in
Panama and during Operation DESERT
STORM. It also deployed in response
to the hijacking of the Italian cruise
ship Achille Lauro, which had eighteen
Americans aboard, and to Somalia in
1993 in what would become the “Black
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Hawk Down” debacle. Other, lessknown operations took place as well.
The results of JSOC’s work before 9/11
were mixed, at best. While the quality of operators in JSOC’s subordinate
units was superb, the JSOC command
and staff—and “Washington”—often
underperformed. Some of these deficiencies would be addressed after 9/11.
The 9/11 attacks produced a sense of
vulnerability for Americans. They also
created a need to respond quickly with
force against those directly and indirectly responsible. No one was more
frustrated by the military’s inability to
strike back quickly than Donald Rumsfeld, the Secretary of Defense. Rumsfeld
looked to General Charles Holland,
commander of the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), for a
plan. He was bitterly disappointed: Holland was unprepared, and therefore was
reluctant to seize the opportunity to take
the war to America’s enemies. However,
JSOC’s reputation, built in part by its
extensive liaison network in Washington
and its sophisticated exercise program,
now grabbed Rumsfeld’s attention. JSOC
easily was able to sell its unique capabilities to an anxious buyer. JSOC’s boundless self-confidence would lead to an
expanded role, because the administration in Washington desperately needed
to go after Al Qaeda and its supporters.
Although JSOC was a subordinate command of USSOCOM, General Holland
was happy to stay on the sidelines. JSOC
would become “almost an independent
military force for Rumsfeld,” under
the command of Major General Dell
Dailey. Everything seemed to be in place
for JSOC to destroy those responsible
for the 9/11 attacks. The leadership in
Washington empowered JSOC to do
whatever was necessary. The superbly
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trained operators were anxious to make
Bin Laden and his lieutenants pay with
their lives for their actions. But, for the
second time, a leadership deficiency on
the part of a senior commander hampered JSOC. General Holland, and now
Major General Dailey, both aviators, did
not have what was necessary to unleash
JSOC’s special operations capabilities.
Both were conservative, conventional
thinkers unable to adapt to a new type of
warfare. The triad necessary for successful action had two elements in hand—
Washington sponsorship and competent
operators—but still lacked a key element: a proper JSOC commander. Major
General Stanley McChrystal would fix
this shortcoming, and with gusto.
McChrystal commanded JSOC for
almost five years, transforming it into
a killing machine in Iraq, Afghanistan,
and beyond. To McChrystal and many
in Washington, JSOC was the “nation’s
main effort in the war on terror.” He was
in charge of a global enterprise, but the
enterprise needed better intelligence and
a better scheme to respond rapidly to
that intelligence. JSOC would expand its
liaison network within the Intelligence
Community and to other organizations
operating in the region. Capturing and
interrogating enemy operatives now
would be preferred to killing them.
JSOC began running agent networks as
well as putting its own operators on the
ground, even in places such as Bengha
zi, to develop situational awareness.
JSOC also demanded extensive aerial
reconnaissance assets. Likewise, war in
the information age pushed JSOC to
develop a cyber capability to hack into
social media and cell phone communications. Then JSOC’s subordinate
units needed to retool to respond to the
growing clarity about the disposition
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of the enemy networks that the intelligence process was producing.
General McChrystal’s force of personality fused all these disparate parts of
the enormous intelligence apparatus
together. Retooling Delta Force, the
Rangers, and SEAL Team 6 was relatively easy; the troops instinctively knew
they needed to operate in small teams
and in unorthodox ways to defeat enemy
networks. They welcomed McChrystal’s aggressiveness and willingness to
take risks. The war was an obsession
for the JSOC commander. It became
McChrystal’s life, and he wanted his
men to understand that the war, and
nothing else, should be their life too. His
single-minded determination was infectious to some and repellent to others.
The JSOC commander had perfected a
process that became known as F3EAD
(“Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyze,
Disseminate”), and the JSOC operations center was called the “Death Star.”
“Strike to develop” intelligence became
the task force catchphrase. McChrystal
had perfected the F3EAD machine, and
the process had become self-sustaining.
Naylor claims that in the U.S. military’s
darkest days in Iraq, JSOC was the only
American force achieving success. This
depends on how you measure success,
especially in light of the contemporary
situation in both Iraq and Afghanistan.
Under McChrystal’s leadership, JSOC’s
operators efficiently and effectively
found, fixed, and captured or killed
high- and midvalue targets and anyone
else they deemed appropriate. Often
they fought their war disconnected
from other U.S. and coalition forces
that were fighting the same war. JSOC’s
size, an issue in the 1980s and 1990s,
grew from about eight hundred to
more than 2,300 in 2008, not including
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a six-hundred-man JSOC intelligence
brigade added in late 2008. JSOC demanded and received a disproportionate
share of assets, including taking control
of other military units not only when
necessary but when convenient—to the
dismay of commanders also charged
with fighting the war. But JSOC did
kill Zarqawi and Bin Laden and many,
many other very bad people. Leaders in
Washington declared, “JSOC is awesome.” Our enemies needed killing, and
no military unit did it better than JSOC.
Naylor tells us that before 9/11 several
key figures described JSOC as “a Ferrari in the garage.” General McChrystal, with the full support of leaders in
Washington, took the Ferrari out of the
garage and created a killing machine
whose performance was unparalleled.
Unfortunately, a discerning reader
easily could conclude that the Ferrari actually was still on the same road
as the rest of the U.S. military—and
that road would lead to nowhere.
HY S. ROTHSTEIN

Ghost Fleet: A Novel of the Next World War, by P.
W. Singer and August Cole. New York: Houghton
Mifflin, 2015. 416 pages. $28 (paperback $14.95,
Kindle $9.99).

No author today will argue with Samuel
Taylor Coleridge’s perspective that any
work of fiction requires the reader
to engage in a willing suspension of
disbelief. The wording of the concept
is important because it goes beyond
the idea of a reader just pushing the “I
believe” button. The concept requires
the reader to be an active participant:
he or she must willingly enter a world
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known to be false. It is the job of the
author to maintain that world, to hold
the reader suspended throughout the
entire book, and to prevent him or
her from falling out of the fictional
world with an ungraceful “whump.”
For the author of a techno-thriller,
holding the reader suspended in this
alternate reality requires even more
finesse than for other types of fiction. The world of a techno-thriller is
relatively close to the world in which the
reader lives. Both the technology and
the environment of the story are set in a
future near enough that all the governmental and organizational structures,
global and domestic relationships, and
technical capabilities showcased in the
story must be close enough to what the
reader knows today to be believable.
This is the challenge P. W. Singer and
August Cole set for themselves in Ghost
Fleet. It is a herculean task. The international backdrop today is far different
from that of the techno-thriller heyday
of the 1980s and early 1990s. The U.S.
cultural setting of Red Storm Rising,
published in 1986, was influenced by
forty years of the Cold War. Dominated
by baby boomers and gen Xers, the
general population of the United States
during that time had limited access to
international news and perspectives,
had grown up with the threat of nuclear
war, and had been indoctrinated with
the ideological vilification of Communism. Today the cultural backdrop
for the U.S. population is as mixed
and varied as the people themselves.
International news and perspectives are
available to anyone, quite literally at the
touch of a finger; the threat of nuclear
war has been replaced with a threat of
terrorism; and ideological vilification
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revolves around extremist religious
groups rather than nation-states.
This techno-thriller, then, with its
hegemonic China overtaking the United
States, feels slightly unbalanced, as if it
is not settled on a firm foundation. It
was only during the last decade that a
majority of Americans came to consider
China a player on the international
stage, and those Americans who view
China as a threat (with the exception of
the U.S. Navy, perhaps) represent both
a smaller percentage and an even newer
phenomenon. In fact, the American
perspective of our relationship with
China over the past ten years probably
can be described best as bipolar, or
maybe schizophrenic; but historically
China has not been considered existentially threatening, and still is not commonly considered so today. Whump.
That means the story Pete Singer and
August Cole create has to be strong
enough to overcome each cultural
inconsistency that unceremoniously
dumps us out of our suspended disbelief.
Unfortunately, the one-dimensional and
stereotyped portrayal of the military
family in the story is representative of
the rest of the characters in the book.
Whump. China’s “Directorate” is a
calculating, unfeeling behemoth. The
Russian character is a vodka-swilling
spy. The insurgent is a femme fatale.
Whump, whump, whump. It may be
an editor’s dream to have characters do
exactly what we presume they would
do, but as a story line it does not carry
enough of a thrill to make the reader
want to stay engaged. Rather than
incorporating strong, motivating factors
(including irrational ones) that would
make erratic actions plausible and add
interest and depth to the story, the
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characters act exactly as their stereotypes suggest they should—and the
results of their actions are predictable.
The strongest element of the book is
the technologies the authors choose to
include. While the overuse of nomenclature feels clunky for all but those
who collect technical classifications
like Boy Scout badges, the authors do
not reach too far into the realm of science fiction to build their arsenal of
weapons, chemicals, and drugs. There
is enough linkage to existing technologies and medical trends to make the
future employment of these moreadvanced programs feel realistic. Even
so, they all fit into a too-predictable,
no-surprise-here mold. There are even
a few moments when the story feels like
a propaganda piece for the Navy’s existing Zumwalt-class destroyer or railgun
programs. Whump, and whump again.
All of which raises the question, who is
the audience P. W. Singer and August
Cole are trying to reach? If it is the
military, we do not need to read four
hundred pages to tell us what we already
know. China’s versions of the concepts of
antiaccess/area-denial and air-sea battle
have brought plenty of visibility to the
future risk China represents, even for
those who have not been watching the
Pacific for years. If the book is intended
for a civilian population that no longer
shares the common cultural backdrop
that existed during the Cold War, it
feels like just another fearmongering
piece written by another advocate for a
bigger defense budget. If it is a plea for
the administration to sit up and take
notice of China as a threat, it does not
do a good enough job of explaining why
all the elements of U.S. national power
supposedly are completely defunct.
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Perhaps all of this is what makes the
book unique, though. While the plot follows the typical path of a techno-thriller,
where an aggressive move by a “bad guy”
forces a “good guy” to join in a fight of
epic proportions, the discomfort the
reader feels at the end is real, despite
all the fully anticipated and stereotyped
characters, plots, and technologies.
But that is not so much thrilling as it is
troubling. The disturbing question that
lurks in the background and permeates the plot like an insidious, deadly
gas is, how effective is the United States
when it comes to using the diplomatic
and informational elements of national
power in the international arena? This
might have been the true heart of the
story. Surrounded by layers of protective
muscle in military might and economic
strength, have the diplomatic and informational elements of U.S. national
power aged and atrophied beyond the
size of the body they inhabit? Without
the diplomatic and informational elements, can the government still operate on just the military and economic
elements? The idea is unexplored, but
Ghost Fleet, with a plot that takes Lady
Liberty’s sword and purse away right
from the start, leaves readers suspended
in a disbelief completely different from
the one they thought they were entering.
CONNIE FRIZZELL

In All Respects Ready: Australia’s Navy in World
War One, by David Stevens. Melbourne, Austral.:
Oxford Univ. Press, 2014. 320 pages. $59.95.

Writing a definitive history of any major
conflict from a single nation’s perspective can be an exacting task—and, in
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the case of the First World War at sea, a
thankless one too, when compared with
the far better known and better reported
situation on land. This notwithstanding,
it is hard to imagine a more timely and
well-balanced book. David Stevens, as
the Royal Australian Navy’s historian,
was perhaps in a perfect position to take
on this project, but this should in no
way diminish what he has achieved. His
extensive and far-reaching research has
produced a work that, while entertaining and readable, has sufficient gravitas
to ensure it will become the definitive work on the subject. This title will
appeal to all audiences; historians will
revel in the wealth of archival material
and private diaries, but this book is far
more appealing than a mere record of
historical fact. Anyone who has been to
sea and experienced life on board ship,
in particular a warship, will appreciate
the insights from someone so obviously
well versed in this area. Drawing heavily on his own seagoing background,
Stevens presents an engaging narrative
that gets to the very heart of the unique
human experience that is life at sea.
In many ways, then, this book represents
the best of both possible approaches
to a history of this type: the broad and
analytical, which sweeps over the major
maritime events of the time, giving
the work its much-needed context;
and the intensely personal, employing many passages from diaries, letters,
and reports that together illustrate the
rich variety of naval life from the deck
plates to the wardroom. To this end,
each chapter ends with a short biography of an important or interesting
figure from the preceding pages, which
both enriches and helps to consolidate
this comprehensive coverage. The book
also triumphs in another aspect: by not
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overlooking the very real administrative challenges the young navy faced in
trying to establish itself simultaneously
with the moment of its supreme test: a
world war at sea. Thus, interspersed with
coverage of all the important actions at
sea is a discussion of the myriad supporting activities necessary to develop
a navy with global reach: the establishment of bases and supply lines; the use
of native labor; the issues of pay and
benefits; the challenges of recruiting and
training; right down to health concerns
and the treatment of offenders and
deserters—it is all there. Even the boredom of the long and often fruitless patrols in search of contraband and intelligence, so much a feature of the war at
sea and yet rarely reported on, is reproduced faithfully in an engaging manner.

ago, came up with the “fleet unit” idea,
as a way for the British dominions to
contribute to the naval defense of the
global economic system—something
that should still resonate today, in this
new era of naval cooperation. Australia
alone among them persevered with it,
and as a result was propelled within a
few short years into the companionship
of those nations with true global reach at
sea. This is an important book because,
above all else, it is a lasting testament
to the character of the Australian sailor.
The hurdles were enormous, but the
Australians, it seems, always rose to the
challenges, overcoming them with ease
under the most trying of circumstances
—and with an alacrity and charm
that has endeared them to all.
ANGUS ROSS

In the end, one is left to marvel at the
foresight of those who, all those years
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